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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the structure of contest equilibria with a variable num-
ber of agents. First we analyze a situation where the total prize depends on
the number of agents and where every single agent faces opportunity costs of
investing in the contest. Second we analyze a situation where the agents face a
trade-oﬀ between productive and appropriative investments. Here, the number
of agents may also inﬂuence the productivity of productive investments. It turns
out that both types of contests may lead to opposing results concerning the op-
timal number of contestants depending on the strength of size eﬀects. Whereas
in the former case individual utility is J-shaped when the number of agents in-
creases, the opposite holds true for the latter case. We discuss the implications of
our ﬁndings for the case of competition on markets and for the case of unstable
property rights.
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In this paper we analyze economic environments that can be characterized as a contest,
which implies that each agent faces a trade-oﬀ between productive and appropriative
activities. Economic interactions in contests are coupled with the number of agents
involved. A change in the size of the group has two eﬀects on the individual perception
of the economic environment. First, the individual inﬂuence on the outcome of the
contest becomes smaller if the group size increases. Second, an increase in the group
size may have an inﬂuence on the total amount of goods that can be distributed. We
call any eﬀect of the size of the group on the total amount of goods size eﬀect and on
the individual fraction of goods slice eﬀect. Size eﬀects are zero if the total amount
of goods is independent of the size of the group. We are interested in the connection
between group size and the structure of contest equilibria. Does an increase in the
group size make the members of the group more or less aggressive? What group size
maximizes individual, what group size aggregate utility? It turns out that the answers
to these questions depend on the quantitative importance of size eﬀects as well as on
the eﬀectiveness of appropriative activities.
In order to analyze the consequences of size eﬀects on the outcome of the contest
we distinguish between two generic forms of contests, both belonging to the class of
‘common-pool’ problems (Grossman 2000). In the ﬁrst contest, the total prize that can
be distributed among the agents is ﬁxed and depends only on the number of agents
in the economy. Investments in the appropriation of the prize, however, incur a cost
for the agents that can be thought of as resulting from a labor–leisure choice, or, more
generally, opportunity costs of alternative uses of time. In the second contest, the total
prize depends on the amount of time invested in productive activities as well as on the
number of agents. Then, the basic trade-oﬀ is between appropriative and productive
activities.
Both contests diﬀer with respect to the source of economic welfare as well as with
respect to the magnitude of appropriable individual resources. In the ﬁrst contest, every
individual has a positive impact on the total amount of goods that can be distributed,
and there exists an individual resource (‘leisure’) that is not due to appropriation by
other individuals. In the second contest, the number of agents has an inﬂuence on
the marginal productivity of production, however, there are no goods to be distributed
without productive investments by the individuals. The total time endowment of an
1agent has either to be devoted to productive activities, which can then be appropriated
by other agents, or to appropriation.
We discuss our ﬁndings using two diﬀerent applications. First, we apply the model
to situations of incomplete or non-enforced property rights. During the last couple
of years, situations of complete and partial anarchy have been fruitfully analyzed by
the application of contest models (for example Bush and Mayer 1982, Hishleifer 1995,
Skaperdas 1992, Grossman and Kim 1995, Grossman 2001 among others). We ask how
conﬂict and production changes if the population increases. Size eﬀects in anarchy can
exist because of economies of scale or scope in the organization of economic activities.
Second, we apply the model to advertising activities of competitors on market
places. Market places are often characterized by positive size eﬀects. In developed
economies there exists a complete and stable set of property rights on market places,
however, the competition for customers creates the formal analogy to the appropriation
of goods in anarchy.1 If it is more attractive for customers to search on markets if the
number of competitors supplying on this market is large, the total gross proﬁt that
can be earned on a market is increasing in the number of competitors supplying on
the market. In order to sell goods on a market with potential competitors, however,
each competitor has to promote the product, which requires investment in advertis-
ing. Hence, the market has the structure of a contest. The two contests we analyze
correspond to diﬀerent situations on a market. The ﬁrst contest portrays a situation
where competitors do not invest in the quality or attractiveness of the marketplace
itself. Hence, the success of a competitor on the market depends only on its invest-
ment in individual advertising, where costs the costs of advertising are equal to the
opportunity costs of investments. The second contest corresponds to a situation where
the attractiveness of the marketplace can be inﬂuenced by the investments of a single
competitor. Examples for this are investments in convenience and security by the cre-
ation of parking lots and the employment of private security guards in classical markets
or the investment in hard- and software that simpliﬁes access to internet platforms.
1In a formal sense the contest-creating activities of competitors to attract customers can be inter-
preted as a result of imperfect property rights. All competitors would gain from a co-ordination of
advertising activities on a minimum level. Hence, they could sign a contract implementing this strat-
egy. In this paper we do not explain why those contracts are not signed. We take it as an empirical
fact that competitors invest in advertising in order to attract customers. A reason for this may be
that co-operation between competitors is explicitly forbidden by competition policy.
2Both, the marketplace and the anarchy interpretation of our model allow to gain
useful insights into the role of group size on the structure of conﬂict equilibria. We
have decided to use the market-place interpretation throughout the presentation of
the model. In a separate Section, we will then discuss how our results relate to the
literature on anarchy and conﬂict.
This paper diﬀers from the previous work on contests because it explicitly allows
for size eﬀects. Standard contest models either assume that the total prize is ﬁxed and
competitors compete for the slice they get (Huck, Konrad, and M¨ uller 2000), or that
competitors can either invest in production, which increases the size of the cake, or
in appropriation, which increases its slice (Grossman and Kim 1995, Grossman 2001).
With the exception of Grossman (2001) size eﬀects of an increase in the number of
participants in the contest have been neglected. A predecessor of our model is the
paper by Hirshleifer (1995) who analyzes a variant of the second contest for the cases
of no and constant size eﬀects (both terms will be made rigorous throughout the text).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model. We derive the basic
results in Section 3 and discuss further applications of the model in Section 4. Section
5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a market for similar goods where n ≥ 2 producers indexed by i compete
for customers. Assuming that goods are close substitutes, a change in producer’s
policy causes a change in demand which, however, is so small that competitors are
not motivated to retaliate. Each producer chooses to invest ai ∈
￿+ units of money in
advertising to appropriate part of the gross market value x. The fraction pi of the gross
value, for short prize, that accrues to producer i is given by the Tullock contest-success







where b ∈ [0,1] is the decisiveness parameter (Hirshleifer 1995) or the discriminatory
power (Skaperdas 1995) of the CSF. From (1), investments do not change the fraction
of the prize appropriated by competitors in the special case where b → 0, and the
marginal eﬀectiveness of advertising has a maximum in cases where b = 1. Thus, other
things equal, larger values of b tend to increase the level of investment in the contest.
3Since products are close substitutes, the potential customers’ evaluation of the
market depends on the number of producers, n, and potentially also on the level of
direct investment, li, chosen by each competitor to increase the overall attractiveness of
the marketplace. The total value of sales on the market, f,t h emarket-value function,
is then given by x = f (n;l1,...,l n). Introducing the parameter g to allow for a non-
linear dependence between x and n, we use two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the market
value function in the following:
1. x = f (n;l1,...,l n)=ngZ, g ∈ [0,2], and the costs of appropriative investment
are Z = ai. This speciﬁcation generalizes the contest analyzed in Grossman
(2001).
2. x = f (n;l1,...,l n)=ng  n
j=1 lj, g ∈ [0,2], and the competitors face a trade-oﬀ
between appropriative and productive investments, where ai + li =1 . 2
Both, the contest-success function as well as the market-value function have the same
interpretation as a standard production function that abstracts from the exact techno-
logical and organizational process of the production process.
Let us assume that competitors are risk neutral. We consider Nash equilibria of the
game. Under the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, competitor i chooses ai to
max
ai
ui (a1,...,a n)=pi (a1,...,a n)n
gZ − ai, (2)







gZ − 1=0 ,i =1 ,...,n. (3)
Hence, in the individual optimum, the marginal increase in the fraction of the market
value accrued by competitor i is equal to the marginal costs caused by an increase in ai.
Under the second speciﬁcation, competitor i solves
max
ai




(1 − aj), (4)











g =0 ,i =1 ,...,n. (5)
2We use a market value function that is linear in investments for analytical convenience. Using a
Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation would not change the qualitative results that follow. A proof is available
from the authors upon request.
4Let us denote by a∗
i(a−i) the argument of maximization for both problems respec-
tively, with a−i denoting investments by all competitors except of i. A Nash equilibrium













for all i =1 ,...,n.
Under both speciﬁcations of the market value function, the simultaneous solution of the
competitors’ optimization problem gives rise to a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
With the ﬁrst market-value function, the equilibrium investment in the contest ai,
the competitors’ net equilibrium proﬁt vi, and the aggregate market surplus x,a r e
ai = aj = b(n − 1)n
g−2Z, (6a)
vi = vj =( n +( 1− n)b)n
g−2Z, (6b)
x =( n +( 1− n)b)n
g−1Z, (6c)
where x is the diﬀerence between total market value and aggregate costs of investments.
Analogously we get for the second speciﬁcation of the market-value function:












It proves useful throughout the paper to introduce the concept of dissipation.3 The
rate of dissipation measures the fraction of the gross market value that is destroyed by
investments in the contest. A contest implies under-dissipation if the sum of invest-
ments in the contest is smaller than the prize, x>0. It implies over-dissipation if the
sum of investments exceeds the prize, x>0, and it implies complete dissipation if the
sum of investments exactly balances the prize, x =0 .
Lemma 1. There is under-dissipation in both contests.
Proof: Market-value function 1: Total investments in the contest are given by na i,
and the total prize of the contest is ngZ. Hence, x>0w h e nngZ>n a i. Using (6c)
we ﬁnd b(1 − n)+n   0, or b   n/(n − 1) > 1 as required by the Lemma.
Market-value function 2: By the same token, under-dissipation implies x>0. From (7c),
x>0r e q u i r e s1+b(n − 1) > 0, or (n − 1) > −1/b, which is always fulﬁlled.  
3See Hillman and Samet (1987).
53 Analysis of size eﬀects
3.1 Market-value function 1
3.1.1 Eﬀects of changes in size eﬀects, discriminatory power, and group
size
We start the discussion of this section with an analysis of a market where competitors do
not invest in its attractiveness. We ﬁrst analyze the inﬂuence of the size parameter g on
the equilibrium investment in the conﬂict and on the equilibrium value of competitors’
net proﬁt and the dissipation. Diﬀerentiation shows
∂ai
∂g
















An increase in size eﬀects has a positive impact on individual investments in the contest,
individual net proﬁts, and aggregate market surplus for all meaningful values of n.T h i s
result has and interesting interpretation. Other things equal, an increase in g has a
positive eﬀect on the total gross market value. Since marginal costs are ﬁxed to be equal
to zero, investments in the contest become more attractive. Moreover, the additional
marginal prize is less then fully dissipated by the increase in investments, which implies
that the aggregate market surplus also increases. The conclusion is that competitors
become more aggressive in their attempt to attract potential consumers. However, the
sharper competition does not result in a utility loss in the presence of size eﬀects.
Next let us discuss the eﬀects of an increase of the number of competitors on ai, vi,
and x. We obtain:
∂ai
∂n








=( n(1 − b)g + b(g − 1))n
g−2Z. (8c)
To interpret (8) let us consider the benchmark case where size eﬀects do not exist,
g = 0. Inspection of (8) shows that the number of competitors has no inﬂuence on
producers’ policy. The argument is that none of the producers can proﬁtably shift the
6distribution of the aggregate market surplus. More formally, we ﬁnd that ∂ai/∂n ≤ 0
at b = 0. Moreover, an inspection of (8) shows that ∂vi/∂n ≤ 0a n d∂x/∂n ≤ 0
at b = 0. Hence, the aggregate market surplus remains constant and the decrease of
individual net proﬁts is linear in the number of competitors.
If investments in the contest are productive, in the sense that competitors can
shift some fraction of the total market surplus to their advantage by increasing ai,
then individual proﬁts are no longer linearly decreasing in n. Increasing n reduces
investments, individual net proﬁts and the aggregate net surplus if b>0. The reason
is that the gross market value is ﬁxed, which makes investments less attractive since
the marginal proﬁtability of investments decrease. Surprisingly, the positive eﬀect of
a reduction of wasteful investments in the contest does, however, not over-compensate
the negative market-sharing eﬀect resulting from intensiﬁed competition.
Let us allow for size eﬀects now. An interesting scenario, which is based on previous
work by Grossman (2001) for a an arbitrary but ﬁxed number of competitors, is the
case where the marginal size eﬀect attributed to an additional competitor is constant.











=( 1 − b)n
−2Z ≥ 0.
Assume that b>0, to exclude the case discussed above. An increase in competition
then increases the investment in the contest and competitors become more aggressive.
The intuition is that the marginal return from investment increases when the aggre-
gate net surplus is growing, causing a reduction of individual utility. Hence, taking
the aggregate net market value as a proxi for welfare in this economy, there exists a
discrepancy between the interest of the single competitor and the interest of a welfare-
maximizing planner. To clarify the argument we make use of the Envelope theorem
to derive the change in individual net proﬁts as dvi/dn = −dai/dn, whereas the net
market value changes by dx/dn =( Z −ai)−nda i/dn. With maximum discriminatory
power, b = 1, the increase in the gross market size is exactly equalized by the increase
in aggressiveness, ∂x/∂n = 0. Hence, for a smaller discriminatory power, the positive
market-value eﬀect is less than oﬀset by the increase in aggression.















Figure 1: Eﬀects of the size parameter and the number of competitors on appropriation.
This leads us to a discussion of the general case where g   1. We start with a
discussion of investment levels:
Result 1. a. If b =0 , ∂ai/∂n =0 .
b. If b>0 and g ≥ 1, ∂ai/∂n > 0.
c. If b>0 and g<1, ∂ai/∂n   0 ⇔ n   (g − 2)/(g − 1).
Proof: The second term in (8a) is equal to zero if b = 0 which proves part a. To prove
part b and c, let b>0. For g =1 ,∂ai/∂n = bZng−3 > 0. Note that ∂a/∂n   0
if and only if n(g − 1)   (g − 2). This implies n   (g − 2)/(g − 1) for g<1a n d
n   (g −2)/(g −1) for g>1. For g>1 the latter condition is always fulﬁlled because
(g − 2)(g − 1) ≤ 0. When g<1t h e n( g − 2)/(g − 1) approaches inﬁnity if b → 1a n d
it vanishes if b → 0. Hence, ∂ai/∂n depends on the relationship between n and g and
the borderline is deﬁned by n =( g − 2)/(g − 1).  
The intuition for this result is as follows. A larger number of competitors implies
that the prize has to be shared among a larger group. Given constant marginal costs,
investments in the contest are proﬁtable when the slice eﬀect is over-compensated by the
size eﬀect for each competitor. This implies that b>0 and the number of competitors
has to be ﬁnite. If the number of competitors becomes inﬁnite, the marginal eﬀect
of a single competitor becomes negligible. However, if size eﬀects are too small, an
increase in competition tends to reduce appropriative investments in the contest exactly
8because the slice eﬀect dominates the size eﬀect, the marginal return from investments
decreases. Result 1 therefore shows that it is not the eﬀect of competition that makes
competitors more aggressive, but the creation of size eﬀects.
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of Result 1. The size parameter, g,i sd r a w n
on the horizontal axis and population size, n, is measured on the vertical axis. Invest-
ments in the contest are decreasing for all points above the dividing line ∂ai/∂n =0 ,
and increasing for all points below. Higher marginal size eﬀects intensify the aggressive-
ness of competitors on the market. However, when marginal size eﬀects are decreasing,
then an increase in the number of competitors will ﬁnally temper the aggressiveness in
the contest.
We now turn to the analysis of the eﬀect of the number of competitors on the
aggregate net value, x.
Result 2. a. If b =0 , ∂x/∂n ≥ 0.
b. If b>0 and g ≥ 1, ∂x/∂n ≥ 0.
c. If b>0 and g<1, ∂x/∂n   0 ⇔ n   b(g − 1)/(g(b − 1)).
Proof: Part a follows directly from (8c). Recall that n ≥ 2. Let b>0 and note
that ∂x/∂n   0 if and only if n(1 − b)g   b(g − 1), which is equivalent to n  
b(1 − g)/(g(1 − b)). For g = 1 this boils down to n   0. For g>1 the limit of
b(1 − g)/(g(1 − b)) for b → 0 is equal to 0 (from below), and it is equal to −∞ for
b → 1. For g<0, the limit of b(1−g)/(g(1 − b)) for b → 0 is equal to 0 (from above),
and approaches inﬁnity for b → 1.  
Result 2 demonstrates that an increase in the number of competitors does increase
aggregate net production if there are increasing marginal returns to size or if the number
of competitors is suﬃciently large. The size eﬀect over-compensates every increase in
the discriminatory power if n increases. The intuition for this ﬁnding is closely related
to the intuition for the change in a:i fg>1 the prize increases over-proportionally
with the number of competitors. This makes the competitors more aggressive but
the increase in output is not fully destroyed by an increase in a because of under-
dissipation. If there are decreasing marginal size eﬀects, an additional competitor still
adds to the aggregate value, however, this additional value decreases with an increase
in n. Hence, the size eﬀect decreases relatively to the slice eﬀect, which is constant.
This makes competitors less aggressive. However, this counterbalancing eﬀect does not
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Figure 2: Change of net-aggregate wealth.
over-compensate the former eﬀect because of under-dissipation. It should be pointed
out that this result shows that there is a qualitative diﬀerence between models without
size eﬀects and models with decreasing or increasing marginal size eﬀects: in a model
without size eﬀects the net aggregate value is linear in the number of competitors,
∂x/∂n = −bZ, and the slope depends linearly on the discriminatory power of the
contest. With size eﬀects the slope can get positive. We will come back to this point
when we discuss the optimal number of competitors in the contest.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate Result 2. In Figure 2, the size parameter g is plotted
along the horizontal axis and the decisiveness parameter b is plotted along the vertical
axis for a given n.4 For large values of b and small values of g, the total net value
is decreasing in the market size, whereas the opposite is true for low values of b and
large values of g. In Figure 3, b is drawn along the abscissa and n is drawn along the
ordinate at given g<1. The Figure illustrates that an increase in n raises aggregate
net value for low values of b. However, if investments in the contest are eﬀective and b
large, then an increase in group size leads to a reduction of aggregate net value.
Next we turn to an analysis of the change in individual net utility vi.
4In order to determine the slope and curvature of the curve ∂x/∂n = 0 use (8c) to get g =
















Figure 3: Eﬀects of discriminatory power and the number of competitors on aggregate
net value (g ≤ 1).
Result 3. a. If g<1, ∂vi/∂n < 0.
b. If g ≥ 1, ∂vi/∂n   0 ⇔ n   b(g − 2)/((g − 1)(1 − b)).
Proof: Part a follows directly from (8b). Recall n ≥ 2. Let b>0 and note that
∂vi/∂n   0 if and only if n(g − 1)(1 − b)   b(g − 2), which is equivalent to
i. n   b(g − 2)/((g − 1)(1 − b)) for g>1,
ii. n   b(g − 2)/((g − 1)(1 − b)) for g<1.
For g = 1 it follows immediately that ∂vi/∂n = −b<0. In case i. the limit of the
right-hand side for b → 0 is 0 (from below) and −∞ for b → 1. Hence, the restriction
≥ 2 is binding, which implies that ∂vi/∂n > 0. In case ii. the limit of the right-hand
side is 0 for b → 0 (from above) and ∞ for b → 1.  
Result 3 implies that an increase in n increases the net utility of the competitors
only if the size eﬀects are large compared to the discriminatory power. The economic
rationale of Result 3 is best understood when (8b) is evaluated for the boundary case
where g =2a n db = 1. Then, size and slice eﬀects balance in a way that net utility
is constant. As illustrated in Figure 4, the contest is less eﬀective for low values of
b, which implies that competitors lower their investments in aggression which leads to
11
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Figure 4: Change of individual utility.
an increase in individual utility. By the same token, individual utility decreases if size
eﬀects are less important.5
An interesting implication of Result 3 is that for suﬃciently strong size eﬀects
(g>1) individual utility is not monotonous in the number of competitors. It is
decreasing up to a critical number of competitors and increasing thereafter. If n is
relatively small, the negative slice eﬀect of an increase in competition is relatively
important and outweighs the size eﬀect. However, increasing n implies that the slice
eﬀect is becoming less important. There exist pairs of (g,b) such that the slice eﬀect
is dominated by the size eﬀect. This ﬁnding shows that the contest creates a J-curve
eﬀect that may hamper the development of markets if the marker grows steadily.
A comparison of Result 2 and Result 3 demonstrates that there may exist a discrep-
ancy between the change in individual utility and aggregate net value when the number
of competitors varies. Figure 5 uniﬁes both conditions. The change in individual utility
and net aggregate value has the same sign for extreme values of b and g. However,
there exists an interval of ‘intermediate’ values for b and g where aggregate net value
increases whereas net utility decreases. The intuition for this discrepancy is as follows.
Recall that net aggregate value, x,i sx = nvi.T h u s , ∂x/∂n = vi + n∂v i/∂n.T h e
5To determine the slope and curvature of the ∂vi/∂n = 0-curve use (8b) to get g =( n − (n +
2)b)/(n−(n+1)b). The ﬁrst and second derivatives of this function show that the curve is increasing.
It is convex in b as long as b ≤ n/(n + 1) and concave thereafter.
12
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Figure 5: Comparison of changes in net-aggregate wealth and individual utility.
ﬁrst term measures the eﬀect of an additional competitors on aggregate utility, which
is always positive. The second term measures the eﬀect of an additional competitor on
other competitors. This eﬀect can be either positive or negative. Hence, if the indi-
vidual utility is increasing, net aggregate value has to increase by deﬁnition. However,
there is a region for which individual utility is decreasing but this decrease does not
over-compensate the eﬀect that a ‘new’ competitor adds to the aggregate. The eﬀect
on the ‘old’ competitors becomes dominant in cases where size eﬀects are small and
discriminatory power is large.
3.1.2 The optimal number of competitors in the contest
A straightforward question is about the optimal number of competitors in the market.
There are two perspectives from which we can determine the optimal number of com-
petitors: from the competitors’ perspective it is given by the number of competitors
that maximizes net utility. From a social point of view the optimal number of com-
petitors maximizes net aggregate value created on this market. Both measures do not
necessarily lead to the same results as we demonstrate below. We start our discussion
considering interior solutions.
Lemma 2. For b>0 and ¬[g =1∧ b =1 ] ,i f∂x/∂n =0 ,t h e n∂2x/∂n2 > 0,h e n c e ,
every interior solution constitutes a minimum.
13Proof: From Result 2 follows that an interior solution requires g<1. In that case it is
characterized by n = b(g−1)/(g(b − 1)). This point is a maximum if the second-order






g−2(1 − b)gZ > 0,
where the second line follows from part c of Result 2.  
Lemma 3. For b>0 and ¬[g =1∧ b =1 ] ,i f∂vi/∂n =0 ,t h e n∂2vi/∂n2 > 0,h e n c e ,
every interior solution is a minimum.
Proof: We know from Result 3 that an interior solution requires g<1. In this case it
is characterized by n = b(g −2)/((g − 1)(1 − b)). It is a maximum if the second-order




(b − 1)g−4(g − 1)g−4Z<0
= n
g−3(b − 1)(g − 1)Z>0.
Form part c. of Result 3 both, (b − 1) and (g − 1) are smaller then zero in an interior
extremum.  
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 together imply that the competitors’ or public optimal num-
ber of competitors is either 2 or ∞ depending on the size eﬀects and the discriminatory
power. The next two results make this conjecture precise.
In order to determine the optimal size of the market we calculate the limit of x and
vi for n →∞ . We get the following result for the net aggregate value.
Result 4. a. If b ∈ [0,1), limn→∞ x
= Z if g =0 ,
= ∞ if g ∈ (0,2].
b. If b =1 , limn→∞ x
=0if g ∈ [0,1),
= Z if g =1 ,
= ∞ if g ∈ (1,2].
14Proof: We have to take the limit of x =( n +( 1− n)b)ng−1Z for n →∞ . It follows
that








at b =1 , lim
n→∞x =

   






The above ﬁnding can be seen as a justiﬁcation of the model of perfect competi-
tion: despite the fact that competitive pressure makes competitors more aggressive in
ﬁghting for customers, the net eﬀect is positive if the size eﬀect is large relative to the
discriminatory power. The bang-bang character of the solution is a consequence of our
assumption that size eﬀect are either globally increasing, decreasing, or constant. This
implies that the optimal market size is either minimal or maximal. A maximal market
size is optimal if b<1a n dg>0o rb =1a n dg>1.
The eﬀect on individual utility can be summarized as follows:
Result 5. a. If b ∈ [0,1), limn→∞ vi
=0if g ∈ [0,1),
= Z if g =1 ,
= ∞ if g ∈ (1,2].
b. If b =1 , limn→∞ vi
=0if g ∈ [0,2),
= Z if g =2 .
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Figure 6: Optimal market size.
Proof: We have to take the limit of vi =( n +( 1− n)b)ng−2Z for n →∞and obtain
at b ∈ [0,1), lim
n→∞vi =

   














It follows from our previous arguments that a maximal market size is optimal if b<1
and g>0o rb =1a n dg>1. Proﬁts are equal to zero if b ∈ [0,1) and g ∈ [0,1) or
if b =1a n dg ∈ [0,2). Market entry tends to eliminate proﬁts for the competitors if
the size eﬀects are not too strong compared to the discriminatory power of the market
contest.
A comparison of Result 4 and Result 5 reveals that the public and private evaluation
of the optimal market size coincides for b ∈ [0,1) and g ∈ (1,2] and b =1a n dg ∈ [0,1)
respectively. They diﬀer for b ∈ [0,1) and g ∈ [0,1] and b =1a n dg ∈ [1,2]. Figure 6
shows the diﬀerence for the case of b ∈ [0,1).
There exists an interesting similarity between the literature on the optimal size of
a population and our approach. It is a well-established result in the theory of optimal
16population size that, in a world with ﬁnite resources, sum-utilitarianism implies an
inﬁnite population with arbitrarily low individual utilities. This property of utilitarian
welfare functions has been called the ‘repugnant conclusion’ by Parﬁtt (1984), see also
Razin and Sadka (1995). On the other hand, average utilitarianism implies a minimal
population with maximal individual utility.
Our results can be interpreted in the spirit of the repugnant conclusion. Individual
utility, vi, coincides with average utilitarianism and net aggregate value, x,w i t hs u m
utilitarianism in our model. In our model, the repugnant conclusion does not occur
as long as size eﬀects are suﬃciently weak (g ∈ [0,1)). The repugnant conclusion
holds when marginal size eﬀects are moderate (g ∈ (1,2)), since then individual utility
and aggregate net value converge in opposite directions. However, if size eﬀects are
suﬃciently strong (g ≥ 2), individual utility and aggregate net value converge in the
same direction again. In our model, the general logic of the repugnant conclusion is
obtained as a special case: if the value of the market grows at a slower rate as the
number of competitors the repugnant conclusion does not occur. It occurs, however, in
cases where the growth of the market exceeds the growth of the competitors moderately.
The reason is that dissipation of part of the potential value in the contest requires a
minimum size eﬀect in order to guarantee increasing aggregate or individual utilities.6
Let us summarize the basic results of this Section:
• First, if size eﬀects exist but are moderately low (g ∈ (0,1)) starting at n =2
an increase in the number of competitors increases aggressiveness if the number
of competitors is small and decreases aggressiveness if it is large. The larger g
the larger becomes the critical number of competitors for which aggression is
ﬁnally reduced. If g ∈ [1,2] competitors unambiguously increase aggression if the
number of competitors increases.
• This implies that for an increase in the number of competitors and g ∈ (0,1),
aggregate net value is ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing. It is unambiguously
increasing if size eﬀects are suﬃciently strong (g ≥ 1).
• Individual utility is decreasing in the number of competitors if size eﬀects are
relatively small (g ≥ 1). However, if they are strong enough (g>1) there exists
6It is straightforward to show that, for b = 0 (there exists no conﬂict in the economy), limn→∞ ui =
0,g < 1;Z,g =1 ,∞,g > 1 and limn→∞ x = Z,g =1 ,∞,g > 1, which replicates the repugnant
conclusion in its standard formulation for g ≤ 1.
17a critical number of competitors below which individual utility is decreasing and
from which on individual utility is increasing.
3.2 Market-value function 2
In this section we will analyze if the results change when competitors face a trade-
oﬀ between investment in the contest success and investment in the market. Under
this speciﬁcation, an increase in the magnitude of the size eﬀect, g, has the following
















In contrast to the previous case where competitors cannot directly invest in the at-
tractiveness of the market, optimal investments in the contest are independent of the
magnitude of the size eﬀect as can be seen from (9a). The reason is that an increase in
g increases the marginal revenue of investments. In addition the increase in marginal
costs exactly oﬀsets the eﬀects of an increase in g, leaving the marginal rate of transfor-
mation between investments in the contest and investments in the market unaﬀected.
Since individual investment decisions are independent of the magnitude of the size ef-
fect, the increase in the gross prize caused by the increase in g is equal to the increase
in the net prize, which is equally divided among competitors. This latter property
explains why the power of the numerator in (9c) exceeds the power of the numerator
in (9b) by one. Hence, individual net utility as well as the aggregate net surplus are
increasing in g.









(g(1 − b(n − 1)) − bn)ng−1




(1 + g + b(g(n − 1) − 1))ng
(1 + b(n − 1))2 . (10c)
18It follows from (10a) follows that an increase in the number of competitors intensiﬁes
their aggressiveness.7 The economic intuition is that investments in the attractiveness
of the market create a positive externality for other competitors. Clearly, the associated
free-rider problem is the more severe the larger is the number of competitors. In other
words, the marginal rate of transformation between investments in the contest and
investments in the market is a function of the number of competitors, which implies
that aggressiveness intensiﬁes if the number of competitors increases.
Following the route of the previous section, we will next analyze the benchmark











(1 + b(n − 1))2 ≥ 0.
The net utility of the competitors is weakly decreasing in n. It remains constant if b =0
because the market technology has constant returns to scale, which implies that the
individual net utility is independent of the number of competitors. However, if b>0
it is decreasing in n:i fb = 1, aggregate net value is constant, hence, individual net
utility has to decrease. By the same token, as long as net aggregate wealth increases
by less then one, individual net utility has to decrease. For all b>the increase in
net aggregate wealth is smaller than one because the market technology has constant
returns to scale and there is a reallocation of investments in the direction of the contest.
Net aggregate value is weakly increasing in n because of under-dissipation: the
potential increase in additional wealth is not completely oﬀset by a reallocation of
investments. Only in the case b = 1, aggregate wealth does not increase if the number
of competitors increases.
Let us turn to the general case now. An inspection of (10c) reveals that ∂x/∂n ≥ 0
for all values of b and g. Increasing the number of competitors increases aggregate
net wealth. An increase of competitors intensiﬁes aggressive behavior, but the waste
caused does not over-compensate the size eﬀect. We may summarize with:
Result 6. ∂x/∂n ≥ 0 ∀ b ∈ [0,1],g∈ [0,2].
The general eﬀect on vi of a change in n is more involved and can be stated as
follows:
7Note that ∂ai/∂n is not a function of g since a is independent of g.
19Result 7. a. If g ≥ 1 or g<1 and g<2b/(1 + b) then there exists no interior
maximum.




Proof: (10b) implies that the value of n fulﬁlling the ﬁrst-order conditions is given by
n =
(b−1)g
b(g−1). Consistency requires that n =( b − 1)g/(b(g − 1)) ≥ 2, which implies that
g ≷ 2b/(1 + b) ⇔ g ≶ 1. g>1a n dg<2b/(1 + b) would imply b>1, a contradiction.
If g<1 the condition g>2b/(1 + b) can be fulﬁlled: for b → 0 the right-hand side
converges to 0. However, if b → 1 the term converges to 1, which implies that it is
fulﬁlled if b is small relative to g.
Assume that the necessary condition for a maximum is fulﬁlled for n ≥ 2. An evaluation






 g−1 (g − 1)3
(b − 1)2.
The term in large brackets is equal to n, which implies that the product of the ﬁrst
two terms is larger than zero for b>0. The third term is smaller than zero because
b<0a n dg<0 by assumption.  
We will clarify the implications of Result 7 after the derivation of the optimal
number of competitors in the contest. Notice that Result 6 implies that x is maximized
if n →∞because of the monotonicity in n.F o r vi we have to compare the corner
solutions n =2a n dn →∞ . This leads to the following Result:
Result 8. a. If g>1, n →∞ .
b. If g =1
i. and b =1 , n ∈ [2,∞),
ii. and b<1, n =2 .
c. If g<1
i. and g>2b/(1 + b), n =( b − 1)g/(b(g − 1)),
ii. and g ≤ 2b/(1 + b), n =2 .
20Proof: Denote by n∗ the optimal n. By the use of the rule of l’Hˆ opital, the limit of vi
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On the other hand, for n =2 ,w eg e tvi(2) = 2gZ/(1 + b). A comparison of this value
with (11) yields for g>0: n∗ →∞ ,f o rg =1 ,a n d( i )b =1 :n∗ ∈ [0,∞), or (ii) b<1:
n∗ =2 . F o rg<1 we get: (i) if g>2b/(1 + b): n∗ =( b − 1)g/b(g − 1), and (ii) if
g ≤ 2b/(1 + b): n∗ = 2, as required by Result 8.  
Results 7 and 8 show that there exists no conﬂict of interest between the individual
and the aggregate perspective for g>1: both, individual utility and aggregate net
value increase in the number of competitors in the market. However, this is not true if
g<1. In this case, the optimal number of competitors from the perspective of a single
competitor depends on both, the discriminatory power in the contest, b,a n dt h es i z e
eﬀect, g. If the size eﬀect is relatively small compared to the discriminatory power, an
increase in competition unambiguously reduces individual utility. In contrast, if the size
eﬀect is relatively large, a critical number of competitors exists which constitutes an
upper bound. Below this bound an increase in competition increases individual utility
and above this bound individual utility is reduced. We can summarize our ﬁndings with
the conclusion that a ﬁnite interior number of competitors exists at which individual
utility is maximized.
The economic intuition for the result is related to the public-goods character of
productive investments. Starting at n =2w i t ha = b/(1 + b), an increase in the num-
ber of competitors intensiﬁes aggressive behavior. Since a converges to 1 for n →∞ ,
the total of the time endowment is invested in aggression. If size eﬀects are relatively
strong compared to discriminatory power, tougher competition has a positive eﬀect on
individual utility. The reason is that the reduction of investments in the attractiveness
of the market is over-compensated by the increase in marginal productivity of these
investments. If the discriminatory power, however, is strong, the reduction in produc-
tive investments immediately over-compensates the increase in marginal productivity
causing a net utility loss. If, on the other hand, the discriminatory power is moder-
ate but the number of competitors high, the increase in marginal productivity cannot
over-compensate the decrease in productive investments since g<1 for a large num-
21ber of competitors. The implication is that there exists an interior optimal number of
competitors from the point of view of the single competitor.
This ﬁnding extends the ﬁrst contest model in two respects. First, without produc-
tive investments by the competitors individual utility is decreasing if g<1a n dm a yb e
either increasing or decreasing if g>1. Extending the model by incorporating produc-
tive investments reduces the extend to which size eﬀects are necessary in order to create
positive eﬀects of competition for the individual competitor. Second, we have seen that
there exists a J-curve eﬀect of increasing competitiveness if size eﬀects are suﬃciently
strong, whereas this eﬀect is inverted in the presence of productive investments.
4 Further applications
A re-interpretation of the model in the context of unstable property rights is straight-
forward:8 in a situation of unstable property rights the production of private goods
essentially creates a common pool from which each individual obtains a share according
to its appropriative investments. Size eﬀects exist in this contexts because of economies
of scale and scope that result from a better organization of individuals. As has become
clear in the present paper, better organization of individuals does, however, not imply
that appropriation becomes less important.
Our results suggest that the production technology matters for the implications of
size eﬀects in anarchy. If size eﬀects merely increase the stock of goods that can be
distributed, our model implies that for large size eﬀects individuals either organize in
very small or very large groups (families and nations, respectively). If the initial group
is small and the group size has to be extended continuously, a growth trap may exist
because of the J-curved shape of individual utility in population size. If size eﬀects
are small, however, it is optimal from an individual point of view to organize in small
units.
In the extended model with productive investments, size eﬀects may merely increase
the return from productive investments. If size eﬀects are suﬃciently small but still
large enough compared to the discriminatory power of the contest, our model implies
8See Grossman and Kim (1995), Grossman (2001) and Skaperdas (1992) for similar models with
an exogenous population size. Hirshleifer (1995) discusses a model where the population size is endo-
genized without fully exploiting the consequences of this extension
22that there exists a ﬁnite group size larger than 2 that maximizes individual utility. This
ﬁnding can be interpreted as the formation of a tribe or a village. The mechanisms that
are responsible for welfare-improvements if the group size increases are comparable to
those discussed in the literature on agglomeration (see for example Krugman 1995),
namely returns to scale. However, the counterbalancing eﬀect that explains a ﬁnite
group size diﬀers in our approach. The literature on agglomeration focuses on trans-
portation costs and crowding. In contrast, our focus is on the absence or instability of
property rights. As we have demonstrated, appropriative activities are an alternative
explanation for a ﬁnite group size even in the presence of globally increasing returns
to scale.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of size eﬀects on contest equilibria. A
primary focus of the analysis has been to explore the consequences of an increase in
the number of competitors involved in the contest on the aggressiveness of the equilibria
and the individual and aggregate utilities of the competitors. Our results show that
the structure of contest equilibria crucially depends on the structure of the size eﬀect.
We have analyzed a situation where the number of agents increases the size of the prize
to be distributed and a situation where the number of agents increases the marginal
eﬀectiveness of productive investments.
Size eﬀects have a natural interpretation in the analysis of competitive forces on
markets where competitors are confronted with two opposing eﬀects. First, the number
of competitors increases the attractiveness of the market from the point of view of the
customers, which, in turn, increases aggregate proﬁts that can be earned on this market.
On the other hand, an increase in competition reduces the slice of the market a single
competitor attracts. Hence, he will react by changing his advertising eﬀorts to attract
customers. Our model shows that an increase in competition may have positive as well
as negative eﬀects on the single competitors, and that the structure of these eﬀects
depends on the structure of the size eﬀects.
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